Respondent Vigorously Argues That This Commission Lacks Jurisdiction Because Of The Doctrine Of Preemption
Respondent vigorously argues that this Commission lacks jurisdiction because of the doctrine of preemption. We find the Respondent's reliance on this doctrine to be misplaced and unsupported by binding precedent. The doctrine of preemption has had a long and varied history through numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The doctrine, simplified in the extreme, holds that where there is a grant of power to the federal government in a field which requires a uniform system of regulation,[2] and the federal government has exercised its power, the states are barred from entering and/or regulating the field. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824); Wilson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, 7 L.Ed. 412 (1829); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, I3 L.Ed. 996 (1851); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, n.2.[3]
The preemptive effect of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (hereinafter the "NLRA" or the "Federal Act") on the authority of the states in the field of labor relations was initially developed by Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), and San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Guss, the United States Supreme Court held that section 10(a)[4] of the NLRA was "the exclusive means whereby States may be enabled to act concerning the matters which Congress has entrusted to the National Labor Relations Board," 353 U.S. at 9, even as to cases over which the Board declines jurisdiction. Because the Board never ceded jurisdiction to state agencies under Section 10(a), Guss created a "no-man's land" of cases which the Board declined to hear and which the states were barred from handling, Garmon extended the reach of Guss to activities arguably protected by Section 7 or 8 of the Federal Act fell within the exclusive province of the Board to decide. If the Board declines to assert jurisdiction, under Guss, the states may not regulate the conduct involved.[5]
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Mediation may not be the most appropriate avenue for resolution in all cases.
For example, it may not be appropriate in cases where: A definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is required; The matter involves or may bear upon significant questions of Government policy that require additional procedures before a final resolution may be made; Maintaining established policies that apply to many people is especially important; The matter significantly affects persons or groups who are not parties to the process; A full public record of the proceeding is important; or The agency must maintain continuing jurisdiction over the matter with authority to alter the disposition of the matter in light of changed circumstances.
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